Air force and air defense troops in the Great Patriotic War and in contemporary military operations

completely through its history mankind has repeatedly adjusted and re-adjusted the forms and modes of armed struggle, its easy in mind and role. At all times, however, there was a single mark of weapons the mass use of which determined the nature of wars and the character played by any single sphere of armed aim An analysis of recent wars and armed conflicts has convincingly testified that fighting in the air-and-space sphere is gradually moving to the fore as the sphere upon which the course and follows of armed struggle depend. The forces of air attacks and the numbers (forces) of air (space-air) defense as a means of do one's best against such forces have become the main constitutings of the opposing troop formations in contemporary wars.

upon 2 October 2003, speaking at the meeting of top commanders of the Armed Forces the Defense Minister of the RF set this idea into a nutshell by the agency of saying: "The air component used by means of the industrially developed states has become the main striking force in conflicts today. Those who are still convinced that today, just as in World War II, tank strikes will bring victory are living in the past. An enemy will not arrive by means of a tank--it will come by the agency of an airplane or will deliver strikes by means of air."

This was partially actual during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 that began with masseed air strikes against lock opener facilities on Soviet territory. We have acquired multisided and rich experience of the use of air force and air defense companys of the Red Army during the war that was extensively used in the post-war years when perfecting the theory and practice of developing and using the Soviet air force and air defense companys This experience was taken into account in local wars and armed conflicts.

What can be described as especially valuable experience of the Great Patriotic War in the field of using air force and air defense troops?

An analysis of the los of aircraft and personnel during the Great Patriotic War made it possible to identify the expedient quantitative and qualitative indices for the aircraft industry and the normative indices of personnel training (both in qualitative and quantitative terms)

It was during the war that the pre-eminent Command found the most adequate organizational forms of air formations and air defense throngs While on the eve of the Great Patriotic War above 50 percent of aviation had belonged to combined-arms armies, through the spring of 1942 there appeared air armies that brought together all air forces of the fronts; there also appeared operational formations (front and armies) of air defense

Centralized command of all air formations and units that belonged to the commander of an air army (it was commanders of air defense formations who commanded the air formations and units of fighters that belonged to the air defense forces) made it possible to use aviation en masse and to concentrate the efforts of air defense multitudes and fighter aviation against enemy aviation in the lock opener sectors of enemy attacks and for defending the lock opener facilities.

It was during the war that the air lay bys of the Supreme Commander Headquarters received the best possible organizational make and composition as well as the best possible means of using them. As applied to the wide Soviet-German forehead and because of the rising productivity of the aircraft industry and the combination of parts to form a whole of personnel training numerous highly maneuverable air corps and divisions of the greatest Commander reserves were set up in 1942

The wartime experience of logistics of air force is still relevant. The war demonstrated that combat air units and formations should not be involved in direct management of logistics units and subunits in order to guard their maneuverability. Logistics was organized according to the territorial principle. This should be borne in mind today when the air force's numerical puissance is limited, while it is wait fored to perform swift and concealed moves in new directions.

It was during the war that the main list and easy in mind of combat tasks of air force and relevant forms and manners took shape. The Red Army commanders believed that air force should achieve domination in the air; support land multitudes on the offensive and defensive; subvert enemy reserves; disrupt enemy communications, and gather intelligence. Victory in operations and battles hanged on how successful the air force was when carrying without these tasks.

Domination in the air was individual of the key tasks; indeed, routing or weakening enemy aviation make lessed the losses of the land forces; helped the R Army more or les safely unfold into battle formations for brow and air operations with the enemy's minimal interference from the air; made it possible to carry without these operations with best possible accrues This is confirmed, in particular, by means of the counteroffensive at Moscow in 1941 and the offensive and defensive operations of 1943-1945

This disposition survived in the postwar years, which is confirmed by the agency of the combat and operational training of the air forces and the experience of local wars and armed conflicts. In the column World War II period practically each local war and armed aim started with the battle for air domination--land operations began when this task was complet It should be said that today, too, domination in the air remains an important factor.