Universal values, specific policies: a conversation with Henry Kissinger

THE NATIONAL INTEREST: There are those who assert that the world "changed" after 9/11; that the international combination of parts to form a whole of the 21st century is defined les by dint of nation-states and increasingly by fresh elements--substate actors, transnational movements and in the way that on--the implication being that the U experience of the frigid War era is increasingly becoming irrelevant as a guide for formulating foreign policy today. What would be your assessment?

HENRY KISSINGER: It is real that entirely new elements have come intoed into international affairs, but the first question single has to answer is whether there are general principles of foreign policy capable of being applied all above the world, simultaneously and in the same manner. I would question that. Different parts of the world are at different stages in their internal disclosure and at different stages in the manner of making of the units that are composing it. Our convictions about what we are trying to achieve should be constant, on the other hand their application has to be adjusted to specific conditions in different regions.

TNI: What would be your rejoinder to those who argue that the domestic nature of any given regime is now the greatest in quantity relevant factor in assessing its relationship with the United States?

HK: The domestic nature of a regime is a factor that has to be considered. I would question, however, whether this can be the solitary benchmark. The proposition also implies that we have an unlimited ability to affect the internal mode of building of regimes. And I would have my doubts about that, too. The difference between the realist and the theoretical or idealistic institute is usually not over objectives. The objectives are usually fairly parallel. The difference is in what can be done in a specific period of time; whether a conception is its own legitimacy or whether practical limits should be adapted to tillage and circumstances.

TNI: individual of the issues of be of importance to is whether a rising China will "buy into" the existing international a whole as opposed to overturning it, as its power increases. The question is in what manner do we define the international system? What does it mean to "buy into" the international system; what aspects do we want them to purchase into?

HK: I question the wisdom of basing policy toward China upon the assumption that it is determined to overturn the international system by the use of military force. A more accurate assumption is that China will look after to play a larger part within the international system, politically and economically, because of its rapid expansion And that is a challenge--of competition--to which we should pay attention.

The at short intervals made analogy of China to imperial Germany is unfair Imperial Germany provoked a war because, in a ten-year period prior to 1914 it challenged Britain's command of the seas with its naval buildup, and its diplomatic strategy was to humiliate France and Russia, in order to demonstrate to them that they were too weak to coalesce against Germany. As a issue they drove them into an alliance eventually joined by the agency of Britain.

For the foreseeable futurity China is unlikely to use its military forces as the principal simple body of its foreign policy. And I don't diocese why it would be rational to await that a China that is encompassed by major countries with significant military packs would challenge the United States militarily and exhaust itself in a military rivalry while it is doing for a like reason well economically.

TNI: What should the United States be doing to enhance its global leadership?

HK: I would incapable of speech claims of hegemony. Any international a whole that has lasted rested in part upon an equilibrium between powers and in part upon consensus among powers. You cannot ease it on one or the other exclusively.

TNI: Is there a danger that other major powers, including China and Russia, may decide to work more closely together to frustrate U interests?

HK: In genuinely military terms, it is actual hard to construct a counter-balancing coalition to the United States. At the same time, the number of issues susceptible to military solutions is also shrinking.

Equilibrium has to be seen in bounds of who lines up with whom upon international issues. In the Iran negotiations we certainly cannot say that we have had an easy time achieving consensus. There is a sort of counter-balancing--not in direct confrontation--but in toning down what we are proposing.

Russia may be tested to pursue tactical rapprochement with China. on the other hand any meaningful strategic rapprochement with China would put in motion Russia further away from the United States and into a position of connection on Chinese support. This would race counter to the strategic realities Russia faces upon its far-eastern border, given the decline in its population and negative demographic trends

We cannot be fixated through things that are in the power of Russia and China to do. The wise American policy is to establish shut relations with both Russia and China. And we should management it on the basis that whenever possible there should always be at least equal--if not greater--incentives or scene of risks to cooperate with the United States than with each other. I think that should be doable.