First order of business: "two new tires … please"

Just individual month after arriving at my first squadron squadron, I flew an offensive-counter-air (OCA) spring [i]or[/i] leap on one leg [i]or[/i] foot as Dash 4 of a mixed division with our sister squadron. The weather had been terrible all weekend, on the other hand it was sunny and warm upon that Monday morning in August. I was new out of the FRS and thrilled to be working upon my strike-fighter weapons and tactics (SFWT) horizontal II qual.

The brief was thorough; I would be flying upon my XO's wing. The XO took time after the brief to make fully convinced I was comfortable with the plan and had answered all nay questions. The man-up, start-up, launch, and mission went not on without a hitch. I was exhilarated as we headed dwelling I had managed to maintain sight and mutual support for the entire flight and had effectively busyed simulated weapons against multiple targets--just as I had been briefed. I felt great.

The division reclaimed to NAS Oceana in a right echelon, parade formation for a four-second break. I broke dirtied-up, went end my landing checklist, and flew the ball to touchdown upon runway 5L. I landed about 1500 feet behind Dash 3 After touchdown, I reach forthed the speed brake and applied gradual aft stick to help decelerate. Just as I passed the short-field arresting gear at about 100 knots, I applied the brakes. The jet did not respond; the brakes felt mushy. I pushed the pedals all the way to the floor, level stood on them, and still nothing happened. I released the compressing and pumped the brakes a next to the first and third time. The pedals again went all the way to the floor, and the jet did not deliberate down.

The distance between Dash 3 and me rapidly was closing, notwithstanding that he had moved to the right half of the runway. I decided to examine the emergency brakes. I released the brakes; grabbed the fulvous emergency-brake handle palm-up; and twitched it out to the ratchet I then reapplied the brakes. No sooner had I applied squeezing when I heard a bang and felt the jet swerve hard left I realized I had swollen the port mainmount, so I applied more compressing to the right pedal to calculator the significant swerve induced by the agency of the tire failure. Another bang and abrupt deceleration told me I just had puffed up the starboard mainmount.

smooth though I had blown the one and the other tires, I breathed a sigh of relief, knowing the jet now was controllable, decelerating rapidly, and tracking straight down the runway again, about 20 feet left of centerline.

I told tower I had experienced a brake and tire failure and would ne a tow as I taxied the jet at les than walking spe not on the runway at the 3-board. Tower quickly answered They had seen the tires fail and were sending a tow and a cleanup ship's company to remove the remains of my tires from the runway.

As I rode in the base-ops trade to the hangar, I had a sinking feeling. I was certain I had made a mistake or view from aboveed something critical during preflight. Maybe, I had not execut the appropriate NATOPS procedures? I must have done something wrongful As soon as I got to the hangar, I grabbed my pouch checklist and went through the practices I had experienced what I perceived to be a brake failure. I reviewed the conducts and confirmed that I, indeed, had execut them appropriately.

In the ready swing the discussion already was well underway when I finally arrived. Everyone agreed you not ever should troubleshoot a brake question on deck. In my situation, the safest course of action would have been to advance the windpipes and go flying again; I immediately conced the point. firing had not been an issue, neither had airspeed or runway remaining. My inhibition toward passing another aircraft upon the runway was unwarranted, considering there was enough of room to pass Dash 3 upon the left, even had I reached him before getting airborne.

Maintenance inspection and troubleshooting revealed no failures in the anti-skid a whole The lack of braking action I had experienced was attributed to my flight being the first after a weekend of true heavy rain, which had soaked the brake pads.

The "Brake Failure" extremity is something normally associated with flight-deck operations. This experience shows however, that a brake failure at high spe which does not involve a los of directional rule warrants the same initial immediate action seen elsewhere in NATOPS, "If discovered after touchdown and flyaway airspeed available-Execute crisis Takeoff Procedure." Next time, I will do just that.

Ltjg Oyler flies with VFA-105.

COPYRIGHT 2006 U Naval Safety Center

COPYRIGHT 2006 Gale Group