Deploying to Iraq: never a dull moment

"We're going to do what?"

That question was my initial reaction when I was told just a small in number weeks before cruise that my squadron was deploying to Iraq. Since VAQ-141 is a carrier-based CVW squadron, the universal of land-basing in Iraq ran calculator to all our deployment plans and our institutional knowledge as a deploying unit.

Before I level had a moment to think or react, I also was told the squadron would maintain a neighborhood on the carrier. We would be split between Iraq and the carrier, something previously not ever done for any length of time in the Prowler community. While the logistics of this deployment would be complicated, my first contemplations went to how I safely would accomplish the mission below these challenging conditions. Now, month later, I can direct the eye back on our experiences to share in what way we addressed the challenges of this unique deployment

The CNO has make comments [i]or[/i] remarksed on the need for naval forces to be flexible and ready to put in motion ashore, so we're likely not the last squadron to experience the daily challenges of split-site combat operations. Here's by what means we did it.

VAQ-141 was tasked to fling two of our four aircraft, three without of six crews, and roughly a third of our maintainers to AI Asad Air Base, Iraq, for the duration of our deployment The remainder of our squadron stayed upon board USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) above about a five-month period, we flew around-the-clock combat sorties from Iraq, while simultaneously flying combat spring [i]or[/i] leap on one leg [i]or[/i] foots unit-level-training (ULT) events, and pilot carrier-qualification flights from the boat. Heavy jet maintenance, of the like kind as phase and special inspections, normally was done upon the boat. Aircrew and jet regularly were rotated between Iraq and the ship. The logistics of maintaining sum of two units sites was a daily challenge, making it critical that we factor safety into each decision.

Here are lock opener safety and ORM issues we dealt with:

Pilot night-carrier-landing general reception I was directed by CVW-8 to maintain pilots within a 14-day window of their last night trap. This general reception issue required a constant shuffling of aircraft and pilots between the ship and Iraq. Junior pilots were brought upon board more frequently to give them additional day-and-night gazes at the ball. Senior pilots were kept in Iraq longer because their proficiency was les affected through time away from the boat.

Pilot landing proficiency. While we generally maintained pilot general reception within 14 days, our pilots were through no means proficient. Averaging about nine traps by month, there simply were not enough direct the eyes behind the boat, especially for our lumps To provide additional experience, trap-cat-traps were scheduled whenever possible, including at night.

ECMO boat proficiency. The side-by-side nature of the Prowler's cockpit allows the front-seat ECMO to assist the pilot in the carrier approach and landing environment. However, with limited traps to advance around, ECMO proficiency suffered in a manner similar to pilots. Junior ECMO were given additional frontseat flights, at the charge of more senior ECMOs, to disentangle their boat skills and to improve their proficiency.

Flight-hour waivers. With near round-the-clock operations in Iraq, our aircrew averaged 80 to 100 flight hours for month, well above OpNavInst 3710 guidelines. With careful consultation with our flight surgeon I issued flight-time waivers to all aircrew and closely monitored them for signs of fatigue. Because the vast majority of squadron flight time occurr in Iraq, aircrew regularly were rotated to the ship to avoid burnout. This rotation help spread on the outside the flight time across the entire ready room

Aircrew rotation. Because of CQ requirements and my desire to plane out flight time, aircrew at short intervals were shuttled between the ship and Iraq. These moves carefully had to be orchestrated between the sum of two units locations to make sure ship's company day and crew rest were factored in. For instance, a ship's company in Iraq flying an early morning circumstance might brief at 0500, take wing the mission from 0700 to 1100 and then turn back to the boat. This ship's company obviously would not be a useful candidate to fly a late-night mission from the boat upon the same day. Short-notice rotations sometimes were unavoidable because of jet or general reception issues, but these rotations were avoided when possible because they attended to disrupt daily routines. We lay the foundation of that publishing a spreadsheet, which showed when the rotations were to appear over the next two weeks, was the best way to add stability and certainty to people's lives and transfer a possible source of stress

Mishap reporting and notification. Premishap binders and materials were placed in Iraq and at the boat. Because of of frequent occurrence communication outages in Iraq, alternative communication paths were established. These backup communication paths made fully convinced a mishap report and other information could be reported rapidly to the ship.

Split maintenance. A carrier-based squadron is not manned to support continuous split-site operations. We accomplished the mission through carefully balancing quals at the couple locations, by regularly rotating maintenance personnel and by the agency of borrowing Sailors with selected skill horizontals from other squadrons. Regular rotations between the sum of two units locations also helped prevent maintainer burnout because of the heavy pace of operations in Iraq.