Remember my mistakes: to say our passes over the target area were low would be an extreme understatement

A series of occurrences took place during a flight, all of which entirely were preventable, completely avoidable, and eventually accrueed in my probationary flight status. A senior officer and shut friend also permanently lost his flight status.

The flight demonstrated almost each example of what any CRM course teaches us to guard against. Our breakdown of flight discipline epitomizes everything we teach our learners subordinates, and peers not to do. Here's by what means not to fly like a professional naval aviator.

I had been an instructor at VF-101 the F-14 Tomcat FR for almost sum of two units years. I fully was qualified in each phase of instruction and had serv as a phase leader for multiple areas of our CNO-directed learner syllabus. I was a qualified mission commander, instrument-ground-school (IGS) instructor, and ship's company resource management (CRM) instructor. I had flown with the VF-2 beneficence Hunters for two combat tours, during which I specifically was chosen to hover almost exclusively with nugget pilots.

My entire aviation background was single of building a reputation as a knowledgeable, endowed and talented radar-intercept officer (RIO).

A two months before the incident, my operations officer, a real senior lieutenant commander, had approached me and asked if I would be willing to act as the VF-101 officer in charge (OinC) for our squadron's part in upcoming GBU-38, Mk-82, JDAM testing. With alone a couple of refresher pupils remaining at VF-101, and no of recent origin students coming in, our squadron was in a unique position to endow Tomcat support to VX-31 and VX-9 We were to help ordeal the new 500-pound JDAM for use through the last two F-14 Tomcat squadrons. As a former JDAM mission-planning, subject-matter dexterous (SME) for VF-2, and with experience deploying the Mk84 JDAM variant in combat, I was excited about taking a lead part in the tests.

Fast-forward sum of two units months. After successfully completing the developmental testing at NAS Patuxent River, we were upon detachment and preparing for the final operational-test flight and weapon launch at NAWS China Lake.

It was a June morning when my operations officer (also my pilot) and I met at the VX-9 ready extent and briefed our test flight. The overall brief was administrationed by VX-9, with my pilot and I completing our ship's company brief immediately afterward. During the pair briefs, the testing points and profiles were overspreaded ad nauseam, with much discussion. We real quickly discussed the possibility of flying a brace bomb-damage-assessment (BDA) passes around the target area in a left-hand, racetrack pattern, if our range time allowed. No minimum altitude was briefed for the post-test BDA passes.

Walk, start-up, and pretakeoff were eventless Even the test itself went almost entirely as planned, with sole a couple very minor hiccups. When we finally released the weapon, and I watched it hit the target upon my LANTIRN video, I was ecstatic. Not solitary was I immensely happy at having l VF-101's part in the testing efforts to bring an important weapon to the remaining Tomcat squadrons, on the contrary I also was pleased that all the hard work, drawn out hours, detachments, and difficulties of the past two-and-a-half month finally had reached fruition.

With just beneath five minutes of range time remaining, our area controller cleared us to drop for BDA passes in the vicinity of the target. Normally, not having a radar altimeter in the back seat, I would have pick outed a repeat of the pilot's HUD upon one of my displays. I then could have monitored the above-ground-level (AGL) altitude of the aircraft in any regime of flight below platform (5000 feet) However, having flown with my pilot upon many occasions, including low-altitude training, combined with my elation at the completion of our testing, I did not prefer the HUD repeat or monitor our AGL altitude other than visually.

After completing a circuit around the range, we come downed and commenced an extremely low-altitude flyby of the target. Climbing as we passed the target, we maintained our left-hand, racetrack pattern and began a next to the first very low-altitude flyby of the target. As we approached the target area during the next to the first pass, our area controller said our range time had elapsed. After completing the next to the first pass, we climbed to break altitude and turn backed to the field. At no time during the sum of two units passes did I say anything to my pilot about our altitude.

The debrief was uninteresting and focused entirely on the testing points we had overlayed in the brief. Neither of us mentioned the depressed passes. Elated at having complet the testing, I just wanted to start my weekend and gazeed forward to a great month of flying when I go [i]or[/i] come backed home.

As it revolveed out, I almost never flew again.

The following week, I was called into my CO's office, and I could sum up at once it was not a celebratory occasion. My skipper was individual of the most relaxed and compos CO I had serv below and it was abundantly clear that he was not happy.

After answering questions about the fact I was asked if I knew anything about a video of our flight. I replied that, ye I had a transcript of the video from our flight, which had been filmed through the range video cameras. I hadn't viewed the video, on the contrary I soon got to preview it with my CO and XO