ROE/RUF: response to Netherland's article misses point entirely

Dear ARMOR,

I am responding to the alphabetic character that appeared in your magazine's May-June 2006 edition, titled "Distinction Must Be Made between the Nature and final cause of ROE and RUF," written by dint of David Graham of the justice Advocate General's Legal Center and institute in response to Captain Netherland's article, "21st-Century masterys of Engagement."

Soldiers do not ne directions of engagement (ROE)/rules on the use of force (RUF) that are constantly tinkered with by means of so-called operational law attorneys. Instead, our forces ne realistic training upon threat identification and response as place forth in Captain Netherland's article describing the ROE/RUF tactical training seminar. Neither Captain Netherland nor I, as course director for the Seminar, advocate training anything outside the doctrinal standard concerning roebuck or RUE Rather, we powerfully believe there is a disconnect between general training methodologies and the tactical realities of use of force rencounters across the mission spectrum.

Despite a clear mandate plant forth in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Standing directions of Engagement, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 312101B para. 1b (13June2005) "Unit commanders at all horizontals shall ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained upon when and how to use force in self-defense" greatest in quantity soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are not fitly trained on threat recognition and the appropriate immediate tactical rejoinder to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. This creates the couple a heightened risk for friendly forces, as well as a greater likelihood of a legally and tactically inappropriate use of force. Neither option prefigures well for mission success.

Many commands make go round to legal advisors to draft and implement guidance concerning this area of relate to Sadly, this often does not ensue in concise rules and better training, on the contrary rather in a plethora of ever-tightening, ever-changing, and tactically ridiculous roebuck being forced down on our forces. The resultant confusion and hesitation makes us a les effective force, as demonstrated through the following real-world examples:

ECP Guards in the verdant Zone. In January 2004, I interviewed five young soldiers performing access control point (ECP) duty at the Coalition Provisional Authority Headquarters in the verdant zone in Baghdad. Each soldier, after getting "off duty" was asked the question "when do you believe you can use deadly force?" I received five different answers, on the other hand the overarching theme of each young soldier was "I don't know, sir, on the contrary I do know that I will be in derange if I fire my weapon." This seeking of affirmation--in other words, is it okay to shoot--is not unusual.

Marines at Fallujah. In Spring 2004 unclassified portions of the roebuck designated members of Iraqi insurgency collections as hostile forces that could be engaged at will. Instead of taking advantage of this authority to kill bad stays many subordinate units, including Marines at Fallujah, layered upon overly restrictive ROE. Unbelievably, at the tactical horizontal one Marine unit was ordered "not to fire unles fired on" In addition to being unnecessarily dangerous and tactically foolish, similar guidance was contrary to the authority provided by the agency of higher headquarters. Moreover, it was in direct contravention to the Marines' inherent right of self-defense

Clearing barrels and accidental discharge paranoia. Soldiers returning to greatest in quantity bases in theater--regardless of their age, rank, or horizontal of experience (to include Special Operations Forces)--must transplant their safely holstered weapons from the holster manipulate them in a concourseed area, and "clear" (unload) them with barrels pointed into sand-filled clearing barrels. When a weapon does, upon occasion, fire into a clearing barrel (isn't that wherefore they have clearing barrels), the command generally crucifies the "guilty" party by means of issuing career-ending nonjudicial punishment. This panic is for a like reason bad that a command sergeant major from a Special Forces unit lately told me that some senior leaders "fake" charging their weapons when they proceed outside the wire so they can avoid the potential for an accidental discharge upon their return to base. There have also been many reports of military members being forced to place strips of colored tape above their magazine wells to visually demonstrate that their weapons are unloaded. A cluster called the "armed forces" has gradually and consistently make knowned a fear of weapons that rivals Disney.

These real-world examples are far more compelling than anything single can glean from reading the of recent origin York Times from the comfort and safety of the schoolhouse. Attempts to bring a band-aid on a serious training deficiency by the agency of writing more restrictive rules is typical of what single would expect from a corporate lawyer, on the contrary it is anathema to the warrior class.

Commanders and soldiers are always looking for simple, direct, and easily applied ROE/RUF that answer their fundamental use of force question, "When can I shake the trigger?" While general guidelines for upper command horizontals can be set forth in the ROE/RUF in an operations order (OPORD), and flat more particularized guidance handed on the outside on ROE cards, the answer to of that kind a question is almost always incident specific and must be based upon the split second judgment of individual soldiers upon the scene. Such judgment-based training is the opposite of the usual rules-based training individuals receive in this area. As a further benefit, this judgment-based training in no way degrades traditional force-on-force combat skills, on the other hand rather enhances them.