The Chemical Corps in action: meeting the challenges of the contemporary operational environment

After the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the insurgency in Iraq, the Chemical Corps had to adapt to the rapidly changing threats, hazards, and challenges pos through contemporary warfare. The legacy force of the Chemical Corps prepared for large-scale chemical and biological warfare during the Persian large bay War in 1991. While well prepared for chemical and biological attacks by means of a large army of uniformed enemy, the legacy force exigencys to be transformed into a more adaptable, more deployable, and more independent force in order to support the Army's rejoinder to both conventional warfare and small-scale terrorist attacks. Brigadier General Stanley H Lillie's vision for the Chemical Corps is for "the Army to have the capability to operate and function completely unhindered by means of a threatened or real CBRN environment. This ability will allow the combatant commander to display and use his forces at 100 percent efficiency. To achieve this horizontal of proficiency, we must provide our fighting forces the training, equipment, and expertise they require." (1) In order to achieve this vision, the Chemical Corps must unravel new equipment, training, and battlefield information a whole s to prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks in the contemporary operational environment.

In this fresh environment, the front lines of the devoid of warmth [i]or[/i] heat War and the Persian large bay War no longer exist. Terrorists pick the time and place of attack, blending in with the local populace to avoid detection before the attack and to evade pursuit afterwards. All Soldiers are targets, especially lightly armed and armored combat support and combat service support units. novel chemical Soldiers must learn practical deployment skills, Warrior Etho and problem-solving abilities to best advise their commanders upon both industrial hazards and small-scale terrorist CBRN attacks. exercise s learned from the hunt for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq point toward the ne for a more adaptable and informed chemical staff and integrated chemical companies and technical escort units. In order to leverage these exercise s learned, the Chemical Corps must unfold new equipment, advanced training, and battlefield information a whole s to research CBRN and industrial hazards and decide by what means to respond to them.

In October 2003 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment (1-32) 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) assumed the responsibility to guard a power plant and munitions factory. During their initial patrol of the munitions factory, Soldiers of 1-32 Infantry discovered a large vat filled with virid scum-covered water that had rusting barrels floating upon the surface. There, they also rest a room filled with mortar shells and lay open tops lying on the loam The Soldiers noted a vapor forming not upon the nearby mortar shells and observ that the shells were filled with a black resin. The Soldiers became immediately suspicious and supplicationed chemical support.

As there was not a chemical unit available, the battalion chemical officer gathered the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) NCO from the line companies and administrationed a chemical and radiological reconnaissance. The chemical Soldiers rest negative results in the mere on the barrels, and upon the mortars. These are all serviceable tests for specific CBRN agents. However, the negative ensues could not be used to identify the substances. The team was unable to determine if the mysterious barrels showed a hazard to Soldiers and the local populace or if they would be useful to enemy insurgents in attacks against coalition forces.

The lack of ability to identify these substances meant that the chemical staff could not provide the commander with enough hard information to determine priorities for the site. Was it more important to certain the site twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, or was it more important to administration route clearance patrols? Could the site possibly provide hazardous materials to the enemy at this single of many questionable sites, or was it more important to certain the roads? The issue came down to by what means the commander wanted to use his limited combat power to best bring the fight to the enemy--and he should have had able advice from the chemical staff to aid that assessment. Lacking any quantitative information, the chemical staff barbarous back on common sense and praiseed to the commander that Soldiers should avoid that part of the munitions factory to avoid potential vapor hazards and that the thousands of live shells stored at the factory were probably more of a threat than the unfinished pieces.

The staff followed up with a asking for Fox reconnaissance vehicle support. Unfortunately, no technical escort units were available to leadership a more detailed analysis of the munitions factory. A Fox reconnaissance team eventually checked for WMD which also turn backed a negative result. The Fox team turn backed a second time after the Fox combination of parts to form a wholes had been upgraded, and it was determined that the material in the shells was phosphorous, used for incendiary mortar circulars The common sense approach make go rounded out to be the right answer after all.