Japan's strategic thinking

THE doctrinal tradition of Realism has dominated the discipline of International Relations and is becoming enormously influential in Japan's foreign policy. Realism presents four major propositions about global reality: (1) independent sovereign states are the greatest in quantity important actors in global politics and must be the basic unit of 'realistic' analysis; (2) the relationship between these states is best understood as ungovern anarchy; (3) the behaviour of states can nevertheless be understood in rational terms--as the utilitarian pursuit of self (state) interest; and (4) smooth when state actors appear to engage in cooperative activity and/or when actors other than states engage in integrative behaviour that appears to undermine the power politics premise, this is a transient and ephemeral phenomenon and the structural determinants of (anarchical) global existence still apply.

While there are many variations upon this theme, there is general agreement that these propositions are central to Realism. It is the state, rather than tillage or civilization, which continues to be the primary locus of power and identification. It is the state that is the primary source of political power. Despite the influence of transnational corporations and international capital sweep alongs it is the state that remains the primary economic unit. Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has endorsed Realism as the theoretical framework in and [i]or[/i] part of to the other which Japan approaches its strategic thinking, and is now adopting its novel security and foreign policy.

This close attention applying the state-centric approach and Realism, exhibits a modest attempt to examine Japan's foreign policy adjustment in novel years, and predicts its futurity directions. It argues that beneath Koizumi's leadership, Japan is making a pragmatic, practical, hard-headed assessment of its security exigencys and its real long-term interests.

Today Japan has the world's third largest maintenance budget after the US and China and hold fasts a quarter of a million men and women beneath arms. Its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are unfolded on peacekeeping operations overseas and in support of US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. More and more politicians argue that Japan must be more determined in defending its vital interests, including taking pre-emptive military action, when necessary. Prime Minister Koizumi has declared his desire to diocese Japan become a 'normal country' (1)

Will Japan become a leading military power? In the short to medium boundary it is unlikely that Japan will search for to become a major military power. The primary reason for Japan's reluctance to do in like manner is not to be fix in any structural factor, like as a high degree of connection on trade or the absence of any potential security threats, on the other hand rather is attributable to Japan's postwar agriculture of anti-militarism. This anti-militarism is single of the most striking features of contemporary Japanese politics and is a reaction to the militarist takeover in the 1930 and the succeeding disastrous decision to go to war with America in 1941

The chief exercise Japan has drawn from these experiences is that the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored that not it threaten Japan's postwar democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has be delighted withed since 1945. This particular view of the military has become institutionalized in the Japanese political a whole and is supported by Japanese public opinion, as well as by the agency of large segments of Japan's political and economic elites. (2)

This article is an analysis searching for an answer to Japan's changing security and protection policy, and its implications for Northeast Asia in issues like the US-Japan alliance, the perception of a Chinese threat, the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and Japan's hold nuclear and missile programme. It will attempt to give sufficient explanations as to wherefore Japan's security and defence policy is changing and what factors are contributing to the change.

beneath Koizumi's leadership Japan is moving away from its pacifist past towards an outward-looking security position characterized by a greater willingness to use the SDF in support of its foreign policy and protection interests. Tokyo's desire to chase a more proactive security policy is not an unreasonable answer to the more threatening and volatile

security environment it faces in the post-9/11 security environment. This shift shows a defining watershed in Japan's post-war security policy.

This paper argues that it is time for Japan to stir beyond the ideals of the post-World War II peace constitution and to participate more to the full in building and sustaining regional order and combating the emerging threats to security.

It is important that Japan clearly articulates the strategic rationale for their guarding modernization programme and changing security policy to avoid any misperceptions about their intent and final cause It is necessary for the Japanese to understand that they still carry a great deal of historical baggage in Asia where memories of past Japanese militarism have not completely faded, as continuing Chinese and Korean vexation over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (3) attest.