DIPLOMACY OF SECURITY: BEHIND THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, THE

ABSTRACT: In early February, 1942 Commander M E Miles propos the establishment of a radio intelligence unit in China. His proposal l to the creation of Naval collection China (NGC), the umbrella organization for units that performed weather forecasting, advised and trained Chinese guerillas, and intercepted and analyzed Japanese radio traffic. NGC was part of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO). greatest in quantity of the commitments of China and NGC were formalized upon 15 April 1943 with the signing of the Sino-American Cooperative Agreement (SACO). Article 18 required further delicate negotiations between Miles and General Tai Li, head of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (China's hid service). Miles was soon trapped between his commitment to Tai Li and Joseph Wenger's relate to that any intercepted traffic shared with the Chinese would quickly become available to the Japanese via insecure Chinese collection of lawss Fleet Radio Unit, China (FRUCHI) resolv this dilemma.

KEYWORDS: Sino American Cooperative Organization (SACO), China, Milton "Mary" Miles, Joseph Wenger, Tai Li, Chiang Kai-shek, Naval clump China (NGC); Fleet Radio Unit, China (FRUCHI); "Friendship", Office of Strategic Services (OSS) management Code and cipher School (GC&CS) Edward Travis, William F Friedman, William J Donovan, J s "Jack" Holtwick, Herbert O. Yardley, Claire L Chennault.

In May of 1942 a clump of about thirty senior naval enlisted men assembled in a cramped basement extent of the Old Navy Building in Washington, DC They were briefed by the agency of Captain Joseph Wenger, assistant director naval communications, Op-20-G and lieutenant Commander Welker (Op-20-GX Intercept and Direction Finding Control) that five offers were required for "a highly classified and hazardous mission of undetermined duration." Five offers including Theodore J. Wildman, came forward. The remainder left the latitude They were told that they could not be told their destination, their departure date or when they might go [i]or[/i] come back Wenger and Welker did not want to jaculate them, "as they felt that the mission would not be a useful single and would waste resources (but they had been overruled); that we probably would be considered expendable."1 This was their introduction to throw Friendship and Naval Group, China (NGC) the umbrella organization for units that performed weather forecasting, coastal watching, sabotage, advising and training Chinese guerrillas, and interception and analysis of Japanese radio traffic. Friendship was short for Friendship Heights, Maryland, a Washington, DC suburb Captain Milton Miles commanded NGC greatest in quantity of the commitments of the Chinese and NGC were formalized upon 15 April 1943 with the signing of the Sino-American Cooperative Agreement (SACO). Miles was instructed, however, to follow further clarification of Article 18 which dealt with the limits of codebreaking cooperation. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed General Tai Li, head of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (China's unknown service), to work with Miles. Miles, an of advanced age China hand, found himself caught between Article 18's gage to cooperate with Tai Li and Wenger's interest with the possible leakage of intercepted intelligence to the Japanese via China's insecure digests Fleet Radio Unit, China (FRUCHI) was the resolution of this dilemma.

In early February, 1942 then Commander M E Miles spoke with Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), about the establishment of a radio intelligence unit in China. McCollum referr him to Captain John R Redman, head of Op-20-G the communications intelligence unit.2 Redman spoke with Miles upon or about 19 February 1942 Miles informed him that he had "information that the Chinese are operating an intelligence unit in Chengtu [in south-west China] with subordinate intercept units at various locations along the China Coastal Area." Miles moveed that "through a certain Attache in the Chinese Embassy we might obtain considerable valuable help and cooperation from the above Chinese intelligence unit" by the agency of helping him purchase ten tape recording machines. Redman noted, helpfully, that if the Corregidor codebreaking unit relocated to Southeast or Southwest Australia, the "distance from Southeast Australia to the center of the China Sea is almost as great as the distance from Honolulu to this point." It was too great "to intercept short range intermediate oftenness transmissions in this area [between Japan, Singapore and the Philippines], particularly if the Japanese are smart enough to hold their power reduced." The propos China sites exhibited an "ideal" location "equidistant from the Japanese Islands, the more important mandated islands, the Dutch East Indies, and Singapore."3

A message was dispatched to US Naval Attache (ALUSNA) Marine lieutenant Colonel James M McHugh upon 20 February asking the feasibility of establishing a small radio intelligence unit of about ten clan in China's interior. Information about radio interception along China's coast was also requested4