An assessment of the lead systems integrator concept as applied to the future combat system program

upon October 12, 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, delivered the keynote address at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual symposium in Washington, DC In this momentous articulate utterance he shared his vision for transforming the Army, with the goal of making the Army's forces "light enough to display lethal enough to fight and win, survivable enough to turn back safely home ... and lean and efficient enough to sustain themselves whatever the mission." The vision called for an immediate off-the-shelf solution--which became the Stryker Brigade Combat Team--to "stimulate the exhibition of doctrine, organizational design, and leader training" as the Army began to disclose new technologies to field the objective force (Shinseki, 1999) A short time later, the Chief of Staff gave the Army its mission: build and field the first Unit of Action, equipped with time to come Combat Systems (FCS), capable of filled spectrum operations, by the extreme point of 2010. The Army's replication to this challenge was to initiate a revolutionary acquisition program that utilizes an innovative a whole development paradigm called a Lead a whole s Integrator (LSI).

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This article provides an assessment of the Lead combination of parts to form a wholes Integrator (LSI) concept, now that it has been in use for nearly 3 years upon the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. It will not assess the progres of the FC program, any of its pro and learn by hearts nor the outlook for its futurity This article will also avoid any quantitative or qualitative measures of in what way the chosen contractor team has been performing as the LSI. Rather, it will examine the idea of using an LSI upon the FCS program, attempt to find the pro and studys of the concept, and proffer recommendations should the Department of Defense (DOD) decide to implement this methodology upon future weapon system acquisitions.

METHODOLOGY

Data for this assessment was gathered via document research and interviews. The authors directioned interviews with representatives from across the FC program, including senior Army officials upon the Department of the Army staff, Army representatives from the FC program office, and other Army personnel from supporting organizations. We also interviewed officials from the LSI, and from their lower-tiered equipment suppliers. Because of the National Defense University's strict non-attribution policy, any make comments [i]or[/i] remarkss referred to in this article, directly or indirectly, will not be attributed to individuals who were interviewed during the research for this article.

conception DEVELOPMENT

In order to fitting the aggressive timeline laid without by the Chief of Staff, the Army formed a partnership with the Defense Advanced Research shoot forward Agency (DARPA). The DARPA had the capability of using contracting instruments that were more flexible and responsive than those available to the Army. The Army/DARPA team enlisted the help of industry in a structur multiphase program. In Phase I, four industry consortia teams were formed. These teams were each comprised of organizations and businesses from across a wide image There were representatives from traditional Army contractors combined with a certain number of whom had little or no experience with Army weapons a whole s Some teams also had members from consulting firms and academia. The teams were provided funding by dint of DARPA to come up with a conceptual design to adapted the Chief of Staff's vision. For the FC program, this was the Army's first utilization of contractors to do what had traditionally been done organically. Industry's rapid and reflective response set the stage for the future

The originates of these four independent studies were then used to evolve the operational requirements for the FC The initial combination of parts to form a whole configuration of the FCS contained nine manned soil vehicles, four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles, four different unmanned robotic sod vehicles, and numerous unmanned turf sensors, communications networks, and intelligence combination of parts to form a wholes The updated configuration, as of August 26 2004 is shown in Figure 1

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Any of these combination of parts to form a wholes would likely warrant an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I or II program by dint of itself. Designing and developing all 20 of them, plus the network combination of parts to form a wholes in half the time normally allotted for a single a whole created a daunting challenge for the Army acquisition workforce.

for what cause [i]or[/i] reason AN LSI?

During the requirements refinement period, program officials quickly recognized the monumental horizontal of effort that would be required to integrate the functionality and operational aspects of all of the a whole s that would be needed to convenient the requirements. These same officials also believed that the Army's acquisition workforce lacked enough family with the expertise to effectuate the systems engineering function in the timeframe and at the horizontal required for the FCS program. Thus, the Army again move rounded to industry to provide the necessary "brainpower," in the form of an LSI. In the words of single senior Army official, "The basic nature of the [FCS] requirement loans itself to using an LSI" (Source #1 personal communication, February 23 2005) His perspective was that the FC acquisition takes major weapon a whole procurements to the next horizontal of complexity, and using an LSI is simply taking the customary role of a prime contractor to the nearest level.