Fantasy politics? restructuring unionism after the good Friday agreement

The generally received arrangements are not a arrangement but a process of concessions--concessions that have move rounded conventional wisdom on its head. management policy has been to reward those who do inequitable whilst punishing those who want to be democratic. What kind of peace proces is that? Democracy must not be held to ransom by the agency of gunmen. (1)

Peter Robinson, legate Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party

While greatest in quantity Protestants welcomed the improved atmosphere arising from the peace proces and the cease-fires, they remained suspicious of the motives of those involved, including the Labour regulation Dublin, the SDLP and, particularly, Sinn Fein. Although they stood to gain from the restoration of devolv conduct and nationalist endorsement of the principle of approval they had lost, at least psychologically, by means of having to include Sinn Fein in the novel administration. They were fearful for the long-term futurity of the British link, with devolv constructions evolving in Scotland and Wales and with nationalists given equal representation with unionists in the 10-member executive. (2)

Barry White, Belfast Telegraph

INTRODUCTION

Politics in Northern Ireland is again in no small state of upheaval and confusion. The potency of political division was mirrored directly in the November 2003 Assembly election, when the Democratic Unionist Party (hereafter DUP) and Sinn Fein emerg as the sum of two units largest political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly. (3) Not surprisingly, the election accelerated the erosion of the already tenuous center loam with the Women's Coalition losing the two of its representatives and the Alliance Party reduc to six seats. Among nationalist parties, Sinn Fein's 235 percent of the consecrated by a vow far outpaced the Social Democratic and Labour Party (hereafter SDLP) which received alone 17 percent of the poll

The changes in the electoral map were flat more dramatic within unionist politics, where the DUP claimed victory above the Ulster Unionist Party (hereafter UUP) a come that certainly reinforced its claim to be the pure voice of Ulster unionism. As the strongest foes of any political settlement, the DUP demonstrated the ability to mobilize large sections of the unionist community behind its position. (4) Overall, the election rises again highlighted increasing levels of unionist disillusionment with the arrangements outlined in what is known as the Belfast Agreement, or more commonly the serviceable Friday Agreement, (5) and the workings of the Northern Ireland Assembly. (6)

The exordium to the election demonstrated the fragility of the political accord. The British regulation suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly in October 2002 Direct government from Westminster was again imposed, widely perceived as the alone short-term solution to increasingly taught political discord in Northern Ireland. This, the fourth suspension of devolv rule in Northern Ireland since February 2000 occurr after it became clear that the working relationships on which the power-sharing government quieted could no longer be sustained. (7)

Political tensions predictably center upon unionist opposition to Sinn Fein's participation in management Much of this was triggered by dint of a series of controversies involving Sinn Fein that included the arrest of three IRA members in Colombia accused of training FARC rebels, (8) and a Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) raid upon Sinn Fein's Stormont offices upon suspicions that an IRA "spy ring" was operating within the Assembly. The sum of two units DUP Assembly ministers, Peter Robinson and Nigel Dodds, reacted by dint of resigning from their posts, refusing to share power with Sinn Fein. Moreover, the Assembly's First Minister, David Trimble, threatened to withdraw UUP ministers if Sinn Fein were not immediately excluded

While Sinn Fein members angrily denounced the foray as a politically motivated stint many unionists emphasized republicans' seeming refusal to fulfill the bourns of the agreement, particularly the section that stated that objectives should be pursu solely by the agency of peaceful, democratic means. This altercation had an immediate and negative impact upon political behavior, as there had been more [i]or[/i] less evidence that suggested the beginnings of the unravelling of reasonable working relationships across republican and loyalist parties in the Assembly. (9) Political reaction to the controversies surrounding the allegations against Sinn Fein stopped this proces short and made the continuance of the Assembly untenable.

Of course, these controversies had an smooth wider impact, disrupting the intricate choreography involving the British and Irish regulations Sinn Fein, and the UUP (10) The latest of these "set pieces" involved further IRA weapons decommissioning. The intricacy of this proces can be seen by means of looking closely at the facts of 21 October 2003. The day began with Tony Blair announcing of recent origin elections to the Assembly. Blair's announcement was followed by the agency of keynote speeches by Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein and General John de Chastelain, the head of the decommissioning material substance both hinting that things were moving forward. Any confidences that real progress would be made were presently dashed, however, when it became clear that the statements had failed to convince the UUP leadership that republicans had mov significantly upon the arms issue. David Trimble then announced that he was putting "the deal upon hold," citing the lack of transparency around the acts of decommissioning and the failure of the republican change to hold to the agreements it had made. Looking upon from the sidelines, the DUP claimed vindication for its position of no public contact with Sinn Fein. As individual commentator put it, "the day which was suppos to herald a breakthrough instead ended in a messy breakdown." (11)