Self-serving or self-actualizing? Models of man and agency costs in different types of family firms: a commentary on "Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms: conceptual issues and exploratory evidence"

In their article "Comparing the agency take away froms of family and non-family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence," Chrisman, Chua, & Litz (2004) lay open a conceptualization and empirical investigation of the consequences of agency relationships in family firms. Their main object is to understand whether, and to what amplitude family firms have higher total agency require to be paid [i]or[/i] undergones than non-family firms. The authors exhibit a conceptual framework, which is of particular value to researchers of family businesses, outlining four conditions that determine the relative horizontal of agency costs in family and non-family firms. These are (1) asymmetric altruism; (2) separation of ownership and