"Been there … done that"

The dictionary defines experience this way:

Experience: noun 1 practical contact with and observation of facts or incidents 2. knowledge or skill acquired above time. 3. an event or casualty which leaves an impression upon one.

verb 1 collision or undergo (an event or occurrence) 2 perceive (an emotion).

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individual of the many challenges in aviation is, oftentimes, experience is alone gained from an event which we would not want to advance through again. In an ironic twist, experience is gained not single from correct decisions, but from the bad individuals as well. For example, an push in the aircraft which we handle in a timely manner garners us experience. Valuable experience is also gained from a poor decision which was made without taking a specific risk assessment, a decision which could have ensueed in dire consequences. Experience gained is sometimes followed through the phrase, "I will not at any time do that again!"

Experience is also an indescribable familiarity with your aircraft and the ability to know when something is not quite right.

There we were, another hazy day in the ROK with minimal airspace. My pupil and I were flying to the small confines of Koon-ni Range for a Basic Fighter Maneuver (BFM) Mission Qualification Training sortie. The learner was an experienced A-10 pilot who freshly finished getting re-qualified in the mighty porker after coming back from his tour in AETC.

After the fourth defensive BFM engagement for the scholar while climbing to the briefed altitudes for the nearest perch setup, the following conversation transpired:

Wingman (WM): "Death Flight, Knock-it-off"

IP: "Death 1 Knock-it-off"

WM: "Death 2 Knock-it-off"

IP: "What's the question 2?"

WM: "All my engine gauges read normal, on the contrary something sounds wrong. It entires like there is a rattling coming from the No. 1 engine."

We promptly accomplished a switches-safe call, and I rejoined for a battle damage check. Nothing appeared without of the ordinary. However, the unsettling noise continued. After a thorough review of all the gauges, we could not find anything unjust with the jet, except for the recurring rattling noise. Not knowing what the moot point was and having no abnormal indications, there was no checklist to race We decided to immediately go [i]or[/i] come back to Osan AB for a chased straight-in. We went [i]or[/i] part of to the other the whole drill of coordinating with the SOF and contacting our Top-3, who concurr with our decision. Landing and rollout were normal. We were thinking that the noise must be something inconsequential, when the arrival of the de-arm ship's company quickly changed that mindset. They informed my wingman that he exigencyed to shut the aircraft down as "parts of the engine were falling to the ground" That rattling noise was the faint unimpaired of an engine in the initial stages of trying to raze itself. Only the well-tuned ears and the significant A-10 flying experience of my wingman hindered this from being a potentially catastrophic engine failure. His experience of the sight, unbroken and feel of the A-10 is what caused him to know something was wrongful with the jet, despite having no other indications.

I am popularly an A-10 Formal Training Unit (FTU) Instructor Pilot. The scholars we fly with have no A-10 flying experience, and greatest in quantity likely will not be able to hear or perceive when something is wrong with the jet They are in the way that focused on trying to be in the right formation position, getting to the correct bombing wire and ensuring special weapons employment. We do not have a two-seat version of the A-10 to direct the eye over their shoulder and permit them know when something in the aircraft is not as it should be. We must rely upon the ability of the learner to verbalize what might be inequitable and also pull from our experience to help interpret what might be happening inside their jet This is veritable not only for emergencies in the jet on the contrary how they employ their weapons and by what means they make decisions in the aircraft as well.

With the pace of the FTU syllabus, experience for an FTU scholar is gained on every sortie. However, experience is something that cannot be increased quickly enough. by what means do we, as single-seat attack pilots, unfold this necessary and potentially lifesaving experience as in a short time as possible into our young pupils and wingmen?

1 difficulty Procedures (EP) discussion: In the "motherhood" portion of the brief, do more than just review the checklist for the designated EP of the day. Talk in-depth about what the scholar will hear, see and have feeling in the jet when the particular pinch happens. "There I was " stories are always beneficial to inform them of others who may have had the particular difficulty and discuss how they handled it. Discuss in what manner the flight will use CRM to handle any necessity which may arise, and by what mode risk management will be used to decide upon a course of action. Discuss thoroughly what their part in the EP will be; whether it is reading checklists, flying chase, or contacting the SOF Make certain they do not have any questions regarding what is awaited of them in an emergency