"Been there … done that"

The dictionary defines experience this way:

Experience: noun 1 practical contact with and observation of facts or facts 2. knowledge or skill acquired above time. 3. an event or transaction which leaves an impression upon one.

verb 1 clash or undergo (an event or occurrence) 2 have feeling (an emotion).

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single of the many challenges in aviation is, oftentimes, experience is sole gained from an event which we would not want to make progress through again. In an ironic twist, experience is gained not alone from correct decisions, but from the bad singles as well. For example, an extremity in the aircraft which we handle in a timely manner garners us experience. Valuable experience is also gained from a poor decision which was made without taking a peculiar risk assessment, a decision which could have be deriveded in dire consequences. Experience gained is sometimes followed by dint of the phrase, "I will not ever do that again!"

Experience is also an indescribable familiarity with your aircraft and the ability to know when something is not quite right.

There we were, another hazy day in the ROK with minimal airspace. My learner and I were flying to the small confines of Koon-ni Range for a Basic Fighter Maneuver (BFM) Mission Qualification Training sortie. The learner was an experienced A-10 pilot who not long ago finished getting re-qualified in the mighty swine after coming back from his tour in AETC.

After the fourth defensive BFM engagement for the scholar while climbing to the briefed altitudes for the nearest perch setup, the following conversation transpired:

Wingman (WM): "Death Flight, Knock-it-off"

IP: "Death 1 Knock-it-off"

WM: "Death 2 Knock-it-off"

IP: "What's the enigma 2?"

WM: "All my engine gauges read normal, on the contrary something sounds wrong. It uninjureds like there is a rattling coming from the No. 1 engine."

We promptly accomplished a switches-safe call, and I rejoined for a battle damage check. Nothing appeared without of the ordinary. However, the unsettling noise continued. After a thorough review of all the gauges, we could not find anything unfair with the jet, except for the recurring rattling noise. Not knowing what the question at issue was and having no abnormal indications, there was no checklist to move swiftly We decided to immediately turn back to Osan AB for a chased straight-in. We went from one side the whole drill of coordinating with the SOF and contacting our Top-3, who concurr with our decision. Landing and rollout were normal. We were thinking that the noise must be something inconsequential, when the arrival of the de-arm ship's company quickly changed that mindset. They informed my wingman that he exigencyed to shut the aircraft down as "parts of the engine were falling to the ground" That rattling noise was the faint whole of an engine in the initial stages of trying to overthrow itself. Only the well-tuned ears and the significant A-10 flying experience of my wingman debared this from being a potentially catastrophic engine failure. His experience of the sight, unimpaired and feel of the A-10 is what caused him to know something was inequitable with the jet, despite having no other indications.

I am generally an A-10 Formal Training Unit (FTU) Instructor Pilot. The learners we fly with have no A-10 flying experience, and greatest in quantity likely will not be able to hear or have feeling when something is wrong with the jet They are with equal reason focused on trying to be in the right formation position, getting to the correct bombing wire and ensuring peculiar weapons employment. We do not have a two-seat version of the A-10 to gaze over their shoulder and suffer them know when something in the aircraft is not as it should be. We must rely upon the ability of the scholar to verbalize what might be inequitable and also pull from our experience to help interpret what might be happening inside their jet This is authentic not only for emergencies in the jet on the contrary how they employ their weapons and in what way they make decisions in the aircraft as well.

With the pace of the FTU syllabus, experience for an FTU pupil is gained on every sortie. However, experience is something that cannot be increased quickly enough. by what mode do we, as single-seat attack pilots, exhibit this necessary and potentially lifesaving experience as in a short time as possible into our young pupils and wingmen?

1 urgency Procedures (EP) discussion: In the "motherhood" portion of the brief, do more than just review the checklist for the designated EP of the day. Talk in-depth about what the learner will hear, see and perceive in the jet when the particular exigency happens. "There I was " stories are always beneficial to inform them of others who may have had the particular pressing necessity and discuss how they handled it. Discuss by what mode the flight will use CRM to handle any pass which may arise, and in what manner risk management will be used to decide upon a course of action. Discuss thoroughly what their part in the EP will be; whether it is reading checklists, flying chase, or contacting the SOF Make fully convinced they do not have any questions regarding what is awaited of them in an emergency