STOP TO THE HAGUE: INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL FACTORS SUPPRESSING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SERBIA

I. INTRODUCTION

Indicted war criminals l at least three of the political parties vying for support in Serbia's parliamentary elections in December 2003 the first held since the downfall of former leader Slobodan Milosevic. While Milosevic's hold Socialist Party (SPS) received seven percent of the consecrated by a vow indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) received twenty-eight percent of total votes1 In casting a ballot for the SR above a quarter of the Serbian voting population formally registered their support for a party calling for an extreme point to Western-style reforms and the go [i]or[/i] come back of Serbian troops to Kosovo Moreover, they implied their acceptance of Seselj an individual who has been awaiting trial at The Hague upon charges of murder, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity. Seselj is also suspected of having links to former Prime Minister Zoran Djinjdic's assassins, individuals from the organized crime cluster the Zemun Clan who discloseed a conspiracy, called "Stop to the Hague," below which they hoped to use the homicide of the Prime Minister to gain dominion government of Serbia.2 Moreover, the Serbian populace reaffirmed their support for Seselj's party in presidential elections in June 2004 and local elections in September 2004 In each of these elections, the SR came in a shut second behind current President Boris Tadic's Democratic party.3

In reviewing these issues Serbian political leaders are quick to point to international squeezing to comply with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as the core reason behind this nationalist upswing and the enigmas plaguing their government. They argue that "the ICTY has been designed in a biased and unfair manner, serving the interests of powerful western states and international organizations at the cost of local (Serbian) interests."4 However, others reckoner by emphasizing that these novel voting patterns in Serbia and the rising vigor of nationalism reflect the dissatisfaction of Serb citizens with their standard of living and the popular government's inability to quell the powerful part of corruption and organized crime in Serbia. These individuals stres in particular, the enduring character of political-criminal networks, remnants of the Milosevic era, which have stalled establishment of the mastery of law and democratic reform in Serbia. This link between the mafia and the rule and the rising strength of these organized crime collections as a result of their political connections, have generated several negative events for democratic consolidation in Serbia.5 The backlash has "included intimidation and blackmail of reformist politicians and justices protection of war criminals, and obstruction of efforts to gather evidence" about war crimes.6 Furthermore, these ICTY proponent argue that the tribunal's point to be solved [i]or[/i] settleds are limited to issues of execution and procedure7

The conflict between those who blame Serbia's try with nationalism on external forces mandating Hague compliance versus those who emphasize the Serbian government's inability to stop corruption and implement the mastership of law has stalled reform in Serbia and weakened the state's transition to democracy. This Article will explore Serbia's popular political status; the interconnection between the conduct organized crime, and corruption; the contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to the state's democratic malaise; and will provide recommendations for advancing Serbia's adoption of the dominion of law. Overall, this Article will argue that Serbia's stalled reform is the spring of both internal and external factors: first, Belgrade's inability to stand over against internal problems, including reigning in corrupt security services and organized crime collections with links to indicted war criminals; and, next to the first the international community's failure to initiate popular support for the ICTY and to calculator the idea that cooperation with the tribunal is necessary primarily for international aid, not justice.

In making this argument, this Article will first explore Serbia's novel political history, focusing on the lasting events of the Milosevic era. Given this background, the Article will then discuss the unique event that tribunals have in shaping the lordship of law in transitional societies, like Serbia. It will then move round to a specific analysis of the ICTY and general issues faced by this tribunal and the not long ago established domestic court for war crimes. Finally, necessary changes to the ICTY and the domestic forum will be recommended

II. SERBIAN POLITICS

A. Remnants of the Milosevic Era

Many of Serbia's popular problems with corruption, organized crime, and other obstacles to democracy main stock from former President Slobodan Milosevic's regime. a great quantity [i]or[/i] amount of of the economic misery br during Milosevic's reign can be viewed as the be derived of both external pressures, from one side international economic sanctions, and the internal squeezing the former leader placed upon the economy through his manipulation of these sanctions. A decade of sanctions imposed through the international community left the Serbian economy in ruins. from one extremity to the other of the 1990s, the economy withered at an average rate of seven percent through year, and the nation experienceed two rounds of hyperinflation, followed by means of the freezing of hard-currency savings.8 As of 1997 industrial output was forty percent of what it had been in 1989 exports were a third of their total before the war, many workers had not been paid in month and plenteous of the well-educated middle class had been displaced.9 As single former middle-class individual stated, "Under the Milosevic regime, if you're not in the inner circle, it won't do you any advantageous to be educated and creative and inventive. You have to have the connections."10