Hindsight is 20-20: what I would have done better as a commander in combat

The design of this article is to highlight four areas where I wish I could have done better as a commander in combat. These four areas are where my lack of focus hindered my company's ability to accomplish its mission in the greatest in quantity efficient and lethal manner. This article is in no way a reflection upon the men of my company or my battalion. I had the distinct privilege of commanding and working with an incredible team of Soldiers, NCO and officers who prov their material time and time again in combat.

After leaving command, I had a unique opportunity to reexamine a certain number of of the problems that I faced in combat from a different point of view:

1) I stayed in touch with the unit that replaced us; and

2) I get backed to Afghanistan twice where I was able to notice a different unit deal with the question at issues that I had faced.

Here is what I learned:

Commanders ne to empower and train junior leaders to make quick, life-or-death decisions upon their own.

in what way we trained at home station

My company had a great opportunity to train prior to our deployment to Afghanistan. We actually implemented the crawl-walk-run method in our training from simple marksmanship [i]or[/i] part of to the other platoon situational training exercises (STXs) and live-fire exercises (LFXs) However, all these occurrences focused on reacting to the enemy's actions. All the live fires began with the pneumatic machine fire-arm firing and the little virid "Ivan" popping up. The squads were skilfuls at reacting to contact. on the other hand what about initiating contact? What about the myriad of different decisions that a junior leader has to make below stress in combat? 1 realized later that I had not disentangleed scenarios that forced my junior leaders to make tough decisions upon the spot, without calling higher for guidance.

comes in Combat

single of the squads, along with the platoon sergeant (PSG) was conducting a night ambush. upon this particular night, four Afghans were walking in a single file upon a trail, and two of them had AK47s. The team leader (TL) spott them and called the squad leader (SL) who called the PSG Now, the PSG was forced to make a quick decision, and he wasn't the individual with eyes on the target. The extremity result was that the four Afghans walked away without any action from the squad. Whether they were combatants or not is not the issue. The issue is that the SL had not been trained and empowered to make this stamp of quick decision.

Doing something would have been better than nothing. After the incident, the first sergeant and I preached this again and again in the fire base, on the other hand it was too late. a certain number of of our junior leaders were trained to react instead of initiate contact, and it was a hard habit to break.

To correct this, we station up a team LFX lane. The teams began the lane in a wadi where they could not diocese up the hill. The platoon leaders (PLs) briefed each team that sum of two units anti-coalition militants (ACMs) had been spott up the hill wearing chest racks, carrying AK-47s and were planting a mine in the road. The PL then locate up two E-type silhouettes with chest racks and AK-47s. The teams then loaded into a cargo HMMWV and started up the hill. The difference in the teams was remarkable. individual team crested the hill and immediately took action. The SAW gunner with no prodding from his team leader, make opened fire and cut down the couple targets. The team then cleared the enemy and secur the area.

Other teams tufted the hill, looked at the obvious enemy, dismounted, formed a wedge, and mov toward the enemy waiting for the proverbial "pneumatic gun" to advance off so they could launch into their battle drill. It was almost unbearable to watch.

by what means to fix the problem

Mind-set

oftentimes leaders try to mitigate this vexed question by adding layers of command and superintendence This is the wrong answer. No matter by what mode many leaders were on a patrol, it was always the newest private or the youngest team leader that saw the enemy first. We must trust our team leaders and squad leaders and empower them to make decisions.

Training

Training should include the repetition and constant drilling that builds a team. However, training junior leaders in stressful situations where they must make split-second, life-or-death decisions without calling higher. The lock opener to making the right decision quickly is to know the commander's intent. If junior leaders internalize the commander's intent, they will make the right decision. Additionally, they must know that they have the trust and confidence of their commander to make these Important decisions upon their own. A big part of this is knowing that the commander will underwrite their mistakes. one time our junior leaders have internalized the commander's intent and know they have the commander's confidence, they will make the right decision and answer expeditiously. Foster an environment in your company where junior leaders are empowered to make decisions and plane to make mistakes. Don't build a zero-defect mentality.

Commanders personally ne to be involved in the gathering and processing of intelligence to focus the company's efforts.