Two-tier health care and the Supreme Court

Making faculty of perception of the Chaoulli decision

POLITICAL DRAMA THIS PAST SPRING FOCUSED upon WHETHER THE Martin government could survive its parcel vote in the House of publics But more significant news was the paramount Court ruling that upheld Dr Jacques Chaoullis challenge to medicare. In the wake of the decision, members of the Inroads listserv argued the meaning of the decision, for health care, freedom and democracy.

From: Tom Mclntosh

If you actually read the Chaoulli decision it is a little different than the instant pundits are assuming. Justice Marie Deschamps, who declined to pierce into the Canadian Charter part of the debate, writes for the majority, "The intention of the Quebec Charter is potentially broader than that of the Canadian Charter and this characteristic should not be disregarded." That means it is not clear that the Quebec law, or similar provincial laws, violate the Canadian Charter. Furthermore, she goe upon to say that "there are a wide range of measures that are les drastic and also les intrusive in relation to the restricted rights." That means the rule could achieve its objective with different means.

So the door has clearly been left unclose for the government of Quebec to amend the offending statutes to protect the restriction on purchasing private insurance. It is premature for anyone to declare victory or grant defeat.

What is extremityed now is the long-delayed public debate upon the kind of health care a whole we want - a debate that is render free of access and honest about the tradeoffs involved in choosing individual model over another.

Tom Mclntosh is director of the Health Network of the Canadian Policy Research Networks and associate professor of political science at the University of Regina.

From: Jan Narveson

Perhaps it is a mistake to have a constitutional commitment to the things the Charter aims at: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the someone and the right not to be deprived thereof omit in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Still, there it is - in the Charter (section 7)

American blogger Scott Lemieux says: "You'll note that this is simply a 'due process' clause, similar to the single in the 5th and 14th amendments in the States. There is no substantive right to purchase private health insurance, or indeed any substantive rights at all." I would have meditation that the right to life is substantive. For example, it entails that citizens can wait for their government to pass a law against assassination Perhaps Lemieux thinks that the expression "principles of fundamental justice" is meaningless. I don't think that courts diocese it that way, nor do 1

What the court lay the foundation of is that the operation of the medical a whole as it stands, deprives a certain number of people of the right to do what in connection seemed to be necessary for maintaining their lives.

Jan Narveson is a professor of philosophy at the University of Waterloo.

From: Gareth Morley

The lock opener question is institutional. Justice Deschamps says that the restrictions upon private insurance were not necessary to foster the public system. For all t know, she's right. For all 1 know, Justice Deschamps would make an admirable minister of health. But if she were minister of health, then she would face a certain quantity of political accountability if she make go rounded out to be wrong.

A hardly any months ago, the Court discarded the claim of parents of autistic children that they had the right to provincial funding of Lovaas treatment beneath section 15, the equality clause. That was a hard decision, on the contrary I think it was the right single Scarcity means someone has to make choices about the allocation of resources, and urgencys to know what the opportunity require to be paid [i]or[/i] undergones are. Courts can't play that character Courts make their decisions based upon evidence put before them by the agency of parties that, in the adversarial combination of parts to form a whole control the process. The traditional lordships of standing and evidence are designed to detain the court focused on the dispute between the parties.

I don't know about section 1 of the Quebec Charter, on the contrary section 7 of the Canadian Charter was clearly intended to be restricted to procedural issues, and its authors were bear uponed with invasion of social policy by means of unelected courts. The Court first ignored those restrictions back in 1985 in the Motor Vehicle relation but claimed that it could be trusted to retain itself restrained, and would not become a superlegislature.

In the sum of two units decades since then, the courts have decided abortion, same-sex marriage and capital punishment (in other countries, no less) have made refugee policy unworkable, and have basically rewritten police powers and criminal manner of proceeding Up until last week, they were still somewhat restrained about the core tax-and-spend areas of policy, on the other hand those days are now above 1 doubt that left or right will consistently like the result

Another thing that disturbs me in the fallout from Chaoulli is the sheer cowardice of the politicians in the face of an imperialist Court. I am for same-sex marriage and two-tier medicine. thus in a sense, I welcome our of recent origin overlords. But I have agitate with the Paul Martins of the world who contemplation that same-sex marriage and two-tier medicine were terrible, until they were call down blessings oned by the courts and became inviolable. I can understand wanting to shift responsibility and therefore blame. on the other hand what happens to the ever-narrowing space of democratic decision-making?