Letters to the editor

To the Editor--Professor Milan Vego's article, "Effects-Based Operations: A Critique" unleashed a scathing attack upon effects-based operations (Issue 41, 2d quarter 2006) Professor Vego is one as well as the other a colleague of mine at the U Naval War guild and one of the greatest living quicks on operational art; many of his criticisms do bare critical weaknesses in effects-based operations (EBO) as it is publicly conceived, and we should do well to take them seriously. At the same time, his article significantly misrepresents several lock opener aspects of EBO--particularly in asserting its incompatibility with operational art and the enduring principles of war.

Granted, a certain quantity of EBO advocates--in their enthusiasm for the more accurate modeling of compounded phenomena that a systems approach enables--seem to disregard the centuries of accumulated knowledge of in what manner battlefield systems (under any other name) actually operate. Dr Vego's critique astutely skewers a not many more egregious examples that present the appearance to violate enduring truths learned from countles battles completely through the ages.

upon the other hand, what EBO proposes--analyzing skillfully the interdependencies underlying an opponent's military power and dismantling the sources of that power by dint of eliminating critical strengths and exploiting critical vulnerabilities--also has been at the heart of warfare for centuries. In fact, this description unbrokens surprisingly similar to good operational art. This is a critical point: As Ralph Peter (another frank EBO critic) notes, the general [i]or[/i] abstract notions and theories underlying EBO are not of recent origin Yet history shows that they are not always the abject failures that Peter depicts; the difference is their application in accordance with--rather than in ignorance or defiance of--the enduring principles of war and edicts of operational art. What EBO adds is guidance for applying these conceptions to facilitate military victory by dint of incorporating critical supporting nonmilitary a whole components into our concept of the operational environment.

We must resist the push to condemn EBO for its generally received roughness or for the occasionally conflicting visions among its proponent No prosperous combat doctrine has ever emerg coherent and flawless from the outset: "first drafts" nurse to be "80 percent solutions" (consider German armored doctrine in the interwar years) that appear ill defined and improbable to the masters of the of advanced age ways. Only after a not many iterations of executing operations, analyzing the comes and adjusting as necessary do they come up as the blitzkrieg of World War II (much les the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s) The rise of carrier warfare from its early days as "heresy" among the "battleship admirals" presents another powerful example of this evolution.

The added emphasis EBO gives to ensuring that rises (effects) produce the desired impact--facilitating accomplishment of the designated objective at each horizontal of war--potentially offers another crucial benefit. As Professor Vego notes, nothing in traditional operational art interrupts an emphasis on results. In the heat of battle, however, leaders too ofttimes lose sight of this and assume that accomplishment of their assigned objectives (perhaps up to and including the strategic level) has in fact attained the goals for which higher authorities locate them out. Provided that EBO does not become an excuse (as Professor Vego aptly cautions) for abandoning the rigorous pursuit and application of operational art, this explicit focus upon effects may provide an additional safeguard against the real fog and friction about which he is concerned

Professor Vego's critique also takes serious issue with the achievability of the kind of metrics foreseen in the effects-based assessment process; this is an area of particular interest in my research as well. My work, however, has conclud that while validly and usefully assessing more [i]or[/i] less types of effects is going to be exceptionally difficult, this is different from saying it is impossible. We have a drawn out history of overcoming such difficulties, and I have explored a certain quantity of possible ways forward elsewhere. individual could even say that operational art itself--and the themes and principles taught in the U Naval War College's Strategy and Policy course and others like it--is just of the like kind a means for coping with the uncertainty of war, recognizing that our business will not ever be reduced to the predictability of science however that we can and must use our growing scientific acumen to provide insights and processe from one side which the operational artist's penetration is applied.

EBO has value if and sole flit is applied in accordance with war's fundamental nature and the regulations of operational art (to include recognizing that if we are at war, that will always involve killing family and breaking things). Moreover, it will take time and effort, and a generous dose of experience, before a valid and unambiguous EBO doctrine sits upon our shelf. The staunchest opposers of effects-based thinking would have us cast in a winding direction the baby (EBO) out with the bathwater just as we are starting to secure it dean. Some of its more wild-eyed advocates would have us cast in a winding direction out the washbasin (operational art and the principles of war) instead. one as well as the other extremes are folly. I drive the great minds on the one and the other sides to suspend their disbelief and focus upon ensuring that our evolving effects-based doctrine incorporates and builds on sound operational art as its foundation--and that operational art does not become an excuse for ceasing to adapt.