After Pinochet: Civilian policies toward the military in the 1990s Chilean democracy

It is a widely accepted notion that military intervention in politics hangs on a complex interplay of historical. institutional social. and political factors (Lowenthal 1974; Fitch 1986; Loveman 1993; Aguero 1998) Scholars generally take single of two broad approaches to understanding and assessing this behavior. The first approach considers the military as a distinctive organization and evaluates to what amplitude military values, worldviews, and conformations differ from the larger society. Adherents of this approach focus upon the military's independent influence in society and in politics; this influence is, for them, significant (for example, Stepan 1988) The next to the first approach thinks of the military as a reflection of dominant societal values, and as an instrument that is entirely or partially pendent on the leadership of civilian decisionmakers.

While asserters of the first approach would offer explaining military intervention in politics through considering aspects such as ideology and horizontals of corporatism in the armed forces, advocates of the next to the first perspective would observe aspects like as the structure of class interests, the officers' social origin, and the alliances that form between civilians and the military. As Charles Mosko give an inkling ofs "neither conception is wholly wrongful nor wholly accurate" (Moskos 1974 34) The conclusion that one as well as the other views are complementary is particularly correct in Latin America, given the armed forces' historical intervention in politics. Therefore, we may assume that the military influence in politics hangs on both the actions of the armed forces and the actions-particularly in bourns of policies and strategic alliances-of civilians in relation to the military.

Another widely accepted idea is that, in many newly democratized countries of Latin America, the armed forces still bring into operation high levels of influence above the political process from the two an institutional and a more informal standpoint (Linz and Stepan 1996; Aguero and Stark 1998) In this faculty of perception several studies have addressed the ne to diminish the legal and political status of the armed forces for a like reason as to deepen democratic regimes, like as Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela.

This article explores the civilian side of the civil-military equation by means of considering how different civilian policies affect the armed forces' subordination to civilian control While it would be difficult to gainsay the independent influence of the armed forces upon the political process, it is also important to application of mind civilian policies and responses toward this impressed sign of military intervention.

This analysis considers the case of Chile, for theoretical as well as methodological reasons. Theoretically, the general literature has suggested mainly an institutional explanation to answer the question of wherefore the military intervenes in politics. Given the high horizontal of military prerogatives, several studies have conclud that the constitutional framework-and the political connected thought [i]or[/i] thoughts inherited from the military regime-limit the options available for advancing civilian mastery over the armed forces (Rabkin 1992-93)

A well-accepted explanation of civil-military relations in posttransition Chile refer tos that three factors elucidate the high horizontal of military influence in politics: the institutional legacies that constrain the actions of the fresh democratic authorities; the enduring military hierarchy below the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet; and a sturdy alliance between the military and right-wing parties (Linz and Stepan 1996; Garreton 1995) According to this argument, changing the patterns of civil-military relations in Chile will require a number of unravellings including transformation of the institutional framework to delineate the military's functional autonomy and its institutional involvement in domestic affairs; breakdown or transformation of the military-rightwing political alliance; a significant electoral defeat of right-wing parties in Congress; and reduction of Pinochet's influence above the military.

Methodologically, Chile appears to be the best example of a Latin American nation with a high horizontal of military autonomy. If there is a political division in which it seems almost impossible to disentangle civilian policies on military affairs, given the legacy of inherited legal constraints, that political division is Chile. Thus, Chile might appear to be the least likely place to discover a meaningful civilian influence in this area. Civilian policymaking faces an institutional framework that favors military involvement in politics, a lusty right-wing sector in Congress that supports the military, and the military's high horizontals of professional and financial autonomy, which allow it to plan its have a title to activities.

This article does not dispute the argument that institutional legacies and political alliances enhance military involvement in politics; indeed, in more [i]or[/i] less cases these factors have played a crucial character What can be misleading in this approach, however, is the implicit idea that these institutional constraints may shut up any option for civilian action and that the alone alternative is to wait until the institutional environment can be changed. This article will display that, despite institutional constraints, civilians have exhibited strategies for dealing with the armed forces using the hardly any institutional and political tools at their disposal.