CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN A CIVILIANIZED STATE: PANAMA

This article traces and analyzes civil-military relations in Panama. After a brief overview of the part of the National Guard in the land politics, the article concentrates upon political developments since the 1989 U invasion to throw down the Noriega regime and the succeeding elimination of the Panamanian military. The close attention seeks to shed light upon political life in an armyless and politically and socially fractionalized political division occupying a sensitive strategic location. The concluding part of the close attention speculates on the possibility that terrorism, domestic security regards and regional considerations may quick Washington and Panamanian leaders to turn end for end the decision to abolish the country's military institution.

As Egypt is a gift of the Nile, Panama owes its actual existence as an independent region to the Panama Canal. The ne to have a waterway that would join the Atlantic and Pacific oceans apted President Theodore Roosevelt's administration to seize mastery of a part of Colombian territory in 1903 and establish an independent, vassal region The small and weak Panamanian state has always been overtly hanging on the United States, and America exercises paramount and pervasive influence upon every aspect of Panamanian life. Article 136 of the country's constitution, for example, grants Washington "the right to intervene in any part of Panama, to re-establish peace and constitutional order if it had been disturbed" (Ropp 1991:371) The country's paper publicity is the American dollar. This dominant and overwhelming influence made the American factor the source of all that went upon in the country, positive as well as negative. Richard L Millett captures the quintessence of this uneasy relationship: "As great as is the actual U influence in Panama, its psychological influence is flat greater." As such, "there is a lengthy history of blaming the United States for everything from the excesse of the Panamanian military to the influence of physic trade" (Millett, 1996:94).

When it came to choosing between realpolitic and honor for democracy and respect for national sovereignty, Washington chose realpolitic and intervened in Panamanian politics to foster America's commercial and other interests, including direction over the Canal and the ten-mile wide Canal cincture Toward this goal the U encouraged and supported the rising political character of the country's National Police in the 1930 (reorganized and renamed as the National Guard in the early 1950s) as a counterweight to the perceived antiAmericanism of the Panamanian nationalists (Partido Panamenista AutenticoPPA), l by the agency of the charismatic Arnulfo Arias Madrid. at the same time the U.S. did not hesitate to put in motion against the Guard (which in 1983 was revamped and renamed Panama's Defense Forces-FDP) in December 1989 when American forces invaded Panama and brought down the military regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega. With Washington's approval, if not outright insistence, the Panamanian National Assembly defied the flows of a national referendum designed to abolish the FDP and vot in 1992 to eliminate altogether the country's military. In the Panama Canal Treaty, which signed in 1977 the U agreed to revolve over sovereignty of the waterway to Panamanian authorities through December 31, 1999. The withdrawal of American forces, coupl with increasing vulnerability associateed to guerilla activities in neighboring Colombia and international terrorism, have caused Washington and Panamanian officials to quietly revisit the issue of regional and Canal security, and with it the wisdom to eliminate the country's military. While Panama remains a political division without an army, changing circumstances and vexing security point to be solved [i]or[/i] settleds may prevail on Panamanian authorities to reconsider the issue.

The aim of this article is to discuss and analyze the character rise, and fall of the military in Panama's political landscape, and evaluate and assess political life in an army-less region in the wake of America's withdrawal, and assess time to come implications in the face of mounting regional and international security pertain tos The article consists of three parts. Part single provides a brief analysis of the part of the Panamanian military Panama's social, political, and economic landscape until the fall of the Noriega regime in 1989 Part sum of two units discusses the nature and weft of the country's politics following the re-introduction of civilian mastery and the elimination of the military. The final part identifies rife and ongoing security and other difficulties and speculates upon the potential for re-militarization of Panama's political life.

THE SETTING

Panama's sensitive geographic location and unique history are responsible for the country's of great depth and ongoing social, economic, and other divisions. The largely English-speaking Canal enclave and the white, European combineed pro-American commercial elite has dominated politics for greatest in quantity of the country's history. admitting growing in numbers, the working class experienced crippling divisions, pitting the higher paid Canal girth workers against the Spanish-speaking industrial proletariat. The former were co-opt by means of the commercial elites while the latter formed the backbone of Arias' nationalist PPA. Land ownership became another source of conflict between a growing class of cattle-raising entrepreneur and poor farmers. Peasants and small fanners were forced to migrate to urban center swelling the ranks of the lumpen proletariat. These and other causes formed the backdrop of a of great depth ongoing, and multidimensional conflict in this small Central American land of about three million race (2004).