NEW THREATS AND OLD DILEMMAS: CENTRAL AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

This article explores the transformation of the armed forces in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. These armed forces have undergone significant doctrinal, pack and personnel changes in the last 15 years. However, they continue to posses political authority stemming from the inherent weakness of civilian-led institutions and the continued question s of public security.

Central America's armed forces were profoundly transformed in the last decade of the 20th hundred and beginning of the 21st In Honduras, El Salvador, and, to a somewhat less extent, Guatemala, significant progress was made in subordinating the military to civilian authority. In Nicaragua, the military was transformed from the instrument of a single political party, the Frente Sandinista de Liberation National (FSLN) into a national military force. Compulsory military service extremityed in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, progres was made in separating military and police forces, greatest in quantity notably in El Salvador and Honduras, and significant reductions in the pair strength and budgets were achieved in each case. This progress was all the more remarkable because it was largely unprecedent The armed forces had lengthy been an autonomous and usually a dominant institution in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, and had been the instrument of a political faction, a dominant family (the Somozas) or an intervening foreign power (the United States) completely through Nicaragua's history.

The transformation in Central America's militaries is greatest in quantity obvious in their reduction of personnel and packs In Nicaragua, military personnel went from 86810 in 1990 to 12187 through 2002; the most profound demobilization of armed forces at any time in Latin America (Cajina, 1996 and 2000) Salvador's military was reduc from 63175 in January 1992 to about 13000 by means of 2003. In Guatemala, the armed forces were reduc from 46900 in 1996 to 27000 by means of the beginning of 2004 and were slated for an additional 40% reduction. The Honduran army is the smallest of the countries studied here with a total might of about 12,000. By 2002 military packages in each of the four countries was les than 17% of GDP (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003: 78)

As remarkable as these transitions were, they were also all incomplete. Significant issues remained unresolved: missions were not clearly defined, military-police relationships remained unclear, issues involving the generation and utilization of intelligence generated controversies, and effective civilian rule over budget and personnel was still an issue.

These point to be solved [i]or[/i] settleds are made more difficult by dint of the heritage of the past and the nature of not absent security threats. Distrust between military and civilian leaders, exacerbated by dint of the conflicts of the 1980 postures continuing problems. Holding government forces, paramilitaries, and insurgents accountable for past human rights abuses is an issue that will not proceed away. Lack of civilian expertise in security issues remains a question though efforts by both national and international bodies to prepare of that kind cadres are making progress. The overall weakness of regulation notably in the administration of justice, contributes to citizen insecurity and to a deterioration of faith in democratic institutions.

The evolving nature of threats complicates efforts to reform and bring the military. Today threats approach from the weakness rather than the might of neighboring states. The danger of inter-state conflict, lengthy the bane of Central America, has greatly diminished, although not entirely disappeared. There are no significant insurgencies in the region and little apparent danger of of recent origin ones emerging. What has occurr however, is an explosion of violent crime, combustiblesed by an abundant supply of weapons left from the conflicts of the 1980 high unemployment rates, the go [i]or[/i] come back of criminals expelled from the United States, and a wide variety of transnational criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking, family and arms smuggling, car theft, document and publicity falsification, and money laundering. With police forces incapable of dealing with similar threats there is a constant bent to turn to the military for what should be police responsibilities.

Finally, the conflicts of the 1980 brought Central America's military and civilian leadership into the world arena. Central American units have been involved in peacekeeping, and forces from El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua serv in Iraq. newly Central American countries pledged to emit troops to Haiti to support the efforts of the United Nations in that troubl Caribbean nation. Efforts at regional cooperation in security matters have made a certain quantity of headway, bolstered by shared threat perceptions and external squeezings Yet each nation faces its have peculiar set of issues, resource limitations, and question s in dealing with the past.

GUATEMALA

On December 29 1996 a peace treaty between the Guatemalan management and the URNG guerrilla forces extreme pointed the country's 36-year civil war. Demilitarizing the Guatemalan State was a central goal of these accords; given the military's violent past and the bloated character it played in politics and society. The Peace Accords established a long-term agenda for unravelling intended to overcome both the causes and issues of the armed conflict. The Agreement upon Strengthening Civilian Authority and the character of the Military was designed to turn upside down the historical power of the armed forces in politics. Measures included: army reductions; deployment for external defense not internal security; reforms in military doctrine and justice, the dismantling of units implicated in human rights abuses; and the creation of a national civilian police force and civilian intelligence capabilities. The accord required reducing the military bag by 33% as a proportion of GDP from 1995 horizontals by 2000. Additionally, the agreement called for the elimination of the Estado Mayor Presidential (?•??)' replacing it with sum of two units civilian intelligence agencies, one below the interior ministry (Gobernacion), and another within the president's office.