IMPACT OF NEO-POPULIST CIVILIAN-MILITARY COALITIONS ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA, THE

This article explores the impact of the ruling Venezuelan civilian-military coalition upon the process of regional integration and upon democracy, equated with the disengagement of the military from civilian politics. allowing results are inconclusive, the application of Solingen's approach and of the general [i]or[/i] abstract notion of neopopulism to the case research lead to conclude that domestic governability and regional peace in southerly America may be in danger in a not with equal reason far off future.

Recently Rosenau (2004:18) has stated that "as globalization threatens and replaces piece of works and widens the gap between rich and poor in many countries, workers and the public react defensively and encourage populist and authoritarian politicians to exploit their discontent " As in Latin America this phenomenon is associated with the formation of neopopulist coalitions, we will attempt to understand what impact the Venezuelan civilian-military coalition may have upon South American economic integration and democracy.

The rationality of concentrating upon the regional aspects rests upon the fact that the extreme point of the Cold War has brought about the regionalization of conflicts and granted greater relevance to domestic forces in the shaping of novel regional landscapes. In developing nations the issue has been both a los of external military and economic support from superpowers for armed forces, and also a renewed interest in the participation of the military in ruling coalitions as a way of retaining political and economic power and influence at residence As Perruci (1995:239) notes, the chilled War in Latin America was plenteous simpler from the point of view of military security questions than today. Nonetheless, the novel period is marked by a promising sweep that has encouraged economic cooperation among nations instead of conflict. Will this run continue in Latin America or will the regional cooperative order based upon regional integration agreements be tip over by recent political developments in domestic civilianmilitary relations in Venezuela? And regarding democracy, by what mode does this phenomenon impact the wait fored disengagement of the military from civilian politics?

This article is divided in three sections. First, we near Solingen's (1997) approach regarding the impact of domestic coalitions upon regional integration and the simple bodys of neo-populism considered potentially dangerous to the disentanglement of democracy. second, we explore the links between domestic coalitions in power, regional integration policy, and democracy in Venezuela. Third, we assess the validity of Solingen's approach and of the neopopulism general [i]or[/i] abstract notion for our case study and its events for South America.

THE NEO-POPULIST DOMESTIC COALITIONS'S IMPACT upon REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY

In 1997 Solingen linked economic liberalization and the emerging see the verb of new regional orders when she wrote that coalitions committed to economic liberalization are more likely to cooperate with countries whose rules show the same orientation, and that coalitions dominated by dint of statist and nationalist interests will have a les cooperative disposition vis-a-vis regional partners (Solingen 1997:68-69) Solingen established sum of two units types of coalitions: (1) liberalizing coalitions, and (2) statist-nationalist coalitions. The first impressed sign is "internationalist" oriented and its aims are freeing up resources to carry without reform at home, weakening assemblages and institutions opposed to reform, and securing access to foreign markets, capital, investments, and technology (Solingen 1997:73-74) The next to the first kind of coalition is eclectic in its composition on the contrary in general, it is willing to accept industrial import-substitution originals and populist programs, as well as the protection of state enterprises. Traditional military sectors are usually part of the next to the first type of coalition because economic adjustment programs are threatening to the military establishment because they curtail their outlays The coalition is held together by dint of the perception of three potential dangers from liberalization - downsized allocations to the military and weapons-producing enterprises, the threat of putting an extremity to "the State's ability to disburse resources among rent-seeking collections (erstwhile justified in "state-building" and national security terms)" and depriving populist leaders of a rich fountain of myths (Solingen 1997:78) For members of a coalition it is their access to governmental resources that helps define and maintain the nature of coalitions. The establishment of links among them at the regional horizontal attempts to achieve the same objective, and the pair strategies undermine the disengagement of the military from civilian politics.

Solingen recognizes that the weakness of liberalizing coalitions can be traced to their failure to distribute the positive issues of reform equitably. When economic reform programs "lead to recessions and reduc public subsidies and investments in infrastructure, while trade liberalization exacerbates unemployment" they are followed through a shift to nationalism. smooth if the political and economic alternative not awayed by the opposition is "unreal," it reaps political benefits from the recessive economic atmosphere, especially if it is draped in a nationalist language that brings the blame on external interventions (Solingen 1997:79-80) on the contrary the ultimate behavior of a domestic coalition will quiet on: "(a) the type of coalition facing single another in a given region; and (b) the coalitions' respective forces relative to their domestic challengers" (Solingen 1997:82) As an example, Solingen neared the case of ArgentineBrazilian cooperation that promot the creation of MERCOSUR on the other hand while the then Argentine ruling coalition had a hardy commitment to downsize military packets balance budgets, and maintain liberalization, its Brazilian counterpart faced able-bodied pressure from the statist-nationalist inclined military and was les committed (Solingen 1997:85-86) This partially explains the question s MERCOSUR encountered after 1996.