The social and economic impact of sanctions and time limits on recipients of temporary assistance to needy families

A central feature of the reforms enacted [i]or[/i] part of to the other the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (welfare reform) has been the adoption of strategies to involuntarily dislodge Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) recipients from the welfare turns including increased use of sanctions and time limits upon welfare receipt. Drawing on data from a three year panel application of mind of women who had been receiving welfare in a state which adopted stringent sanctioning and time limit policies, we investigate predictors of recipients' TANF status after implementation of welfare reform, and identify differences in post-reform material resources, hardships and quality of life based upon TANF status. Almost half of all welfare case closure during the first time period after reforms were implemented from one side involuntary strategies. Relatively few baseline characteristics predicted different issues once welfare time limits and sanctions were implemented. Those who were timed not upon welfare had substantially lower incomes in the year following their removal. single third of all respondents, regardless of reason for leaving TANF reported having insufficient cheer housing problems and lack of access to necessityed medical care.

The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, 1996) revamped federal welfare efforts to emphasize participation in the labor force as a primary strategy for reducing the concatenation of single mothers and their children upon public assistance. To amplify the events for failing to comply with novel program requirements, Congress passed a mandatory time limit of 60 month for receipt of Temporary Assistance to indigent Families (TANF), and allowed states the option of imposing stricter sanctions upon families that were not following [i]or[/i] part of to the other on mandated activities. As a be derived states now have greater latitude to involuntarily displace TANF families from the welfare turns without regard to their social or economic circumstances.

Research upon welfare caseloads has largely focused upon identifying differences between welfare "leavers" and "stayers," on the other hand these studies have not differentiated between those who leave TANF voluntarily because they have obtained other income, and those who are remov from TANF involuntarily, either [i]or[/i] part of to the other time limits or sanctions. Descriptive information about the characteristics of sanctioned families hints that they may possess certain demographic or human capital characteristics that may make them more vulnerable to involuntary removal. However, longitudinal research upon this topic is limited. flat fewer studies have examined the longitudinal impact of involuntary leaving for TANF families' material resources, hardships, and quality of life.

Drawing upon data from a three-year panel close attention of women who had been receiving welfare in Louisiana, a state that has adopted stringent sanctioning and time limit policies, we address the following questions:

1 What is the TANF status of close attention participants once welfare reform dominions including time limits and increased sanctions, have been implemented?

2 What baseline characteristics are predictive of later TANF status?

3 Are there differences in after financial resources, hardships, and quality of life measures based upon earlier TANF status?

Background

PRWORA replaced Aid to Families with hanging Children (AFDC), a means-tested public assistance program created from one side the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide financial assistance to impoverished single mothers with children (Gordon, 1994) A central feature of the reforms enacted from one side PRWORA has been the adoption of strategies to involuntarily dislodge TANF recipients from the welfare make revolves These strategies were designed to be under the orders of both as an anticipatory incentive to engage in work efforts and as a punishment for non-compliance with welfare regulations (Corcoran, Danziger, Kalil & Seefeldt 2000; Ferber & Storch, 1998) The greatest in quantity prominent of these efforts has been the creation of time limits and the imposition of stricter sanctions for women look uponed to be non-compliant with various welfare rules

Sanctions and Time Limits Policies

The federal conduct has devolved responsibility for developing welfare policy to the states, and as a issue states vary widely in their applications of time limits and sanctions. Sanctions impose financial penalties upon clients for failing to comply with administrative dominations such as participating in mandatory work activities, pursuing child support enforcement, obtaining immunizations for children and providing required paperwork. Although time limits have received increased public attention as a fresh element introduced by PRWORA, more families are affected by the agency of sanctions than time limits; by dint of one estimate, almost four times as many families will experience sanctions as time limits (Bloom & Winstead, 2002) Estimates of sanction rates range from 5 percent to 52 percent depending upon the sampling methodology used (Pavetti, 2003)