AGENDA SETTING IN AN ELECTED SUPREME COURT: THE CASE OF OHIO

The ability for a high court to locate its own agenda is a powerful political tool. at the same time gatekeeping decisions of state high courts have received insufficient scholarly attention in new years. Previous studies have focused on either the impact of ideology upon case selection or justices' perceptions of the specific role of the court, notwithstanding these approaches may ignore other lock opener institutional influences. This study proofs the influence of salient issues and interests and attorney expertise and experience on the decisions of the pick outed justices on the Supreme Court of Ohio. The findings reveal that cases involving issues and interests prominent in the arena of Ohio principal Court electoral politics are influential upon the gatekeeping decisions of the high-court jurists. Justices provide access, in the form of discretionary promiseds to review, to salient cases of bear upon to those individuals and clumps who provide them with campaign contributions and political support. The follows also show that a petitioning attorney's prosperous track record in securing review is influential in obtaining gatekeeping consecrated by a vows

The ability to locate the agenda is a critical tool for political institutions. It is well known that agenda setting-the defining and ordering of alternatives-directly influences political issues (see Kingdon, 1984). For state high courts, agenda setting is a significant power since the majority of state courts of last resort have more [i]or[/i] less discretion over the number and impressed signs of cases on their dockets (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998) Because a court's selection of cases affects one as well as the other the fortunes of the litigants, as well as the contours of the policy landscape, understanding the determinants of case selection in high courts is quite important (Baum, 1977)

While a great quantity [i]or[/i] amount of research has been conducted in examining gatekeeping decisions in the U principal Court (see, e.g., Caldeira and Wright, 1988 1990b 1994; McGuire and Caldeira, 1993; Perry 1991; Provine, 1980; Tanenhaus et al., 1963; Ulmer 1984) les scholarly attention has been devot to case selection in the states. Using the greatest Court studies as theoretical guideposts, research examining state high-court agenda setting has watched to focus on the impact of attitudinal factors (see eg Baum 1977 1979) and character perceptions (see, e.g., Dudley, 1986; Flango, 1987) notwithstanding given the unique institutional environments of state high courts, the utility of these approaches may be limited-especially when single is trying to understand the agenda-setting processe of picked state high courts.

We know that the merits decisions of culled justices are affected by political crushings A number of studies have ground that appeasing constituencies and minimizing electoral opposition can be important factors in the decisions of state highcourt justices and can plane override the justices' policy estimations (Brace and Hall, 1993; Hall, 1987 1992; Hall and Brace, 1989 1996) Although these studies do not focus upon agenda setting, they provide compelling evidence of the powerful events that concern for reelection can have on judicial behavior. Thus, it may be that make choice ofed justices who operate in a political arena featuring powerful interest assemblages and competition for political endorsements and campaign contributions make gatekeeping decisions with an organ of vision toward shoring up political support. This close attention seeks to take a pace toward testing this proposition by means of examining gatekeeping votes on cases concerning issues of importance to politically powerful interests.

I recommend that the agenda-setting decisions of single outed high-court justices are made in consideration of electoral considerations, personal policy precedences and professional and legal norms. Like members of Congres fix uponed justices have a proximate goal of reelection (Mayhew, 1974) and they may use their agenda-setting powers to further it. Because of their greater exposing to political pressures, elected justices may be more likely to cast agenda-setting consecrated by a vows in favor of cases important to political actors who feature prominently in the electoral landscape and support the justices' reelection efforts. And, as others have demonstrated (see eg Baum, 1977 1979) make choice ofed justices will also vote to hear cases containing issues they care about to create or lift on high precedents that further their policy views. However, prefered justices likely make these decisions make subordinate to legal and professional norms, similar as maintaining uniformity in the law and valuing clarity in presenting issues and arguments. Moreover, justices have a limited amount of time and efficiency so they are more likely to consecrated by a vow to hear cases they wish to (Baum, 1977; Caldeira and Wright, 1988 1994) at the same time these constraints are minimal and unlikely to inhibit greatly the justices' gatekeeping decisions.

Prior studies of case selection may have view from aboveed key factors common to the two elective and appointive systems. single that is of particular importance is the experience, expertise, and prominence of the attorneys, which may be influential upon justices' gatekeeping calculus. Skilled attorneys may be better able to frame and highlight important legal issues and attract favorable consecrated by a vows for review from high courts. Testing their influence, along with the underlying issues or parties in or the policy impact of the cases, provides a better understanding of by what means agenda setting is structured.